What does it mean to consider the world of AI through a Christian lens? Rapid developments in AI continue to reshape society, raising new ethical questions and challenging our understanding of the human person. Encountering Artificial Intelligence draws on Pope Francis’ discussion of a culture of encounter and broader themes in Catholic social thought in order to examine how current AI applications affect human relationships in various social spheres and offers concrete recommendations for better implementation. The document also explores questions (...) regarding personhood, consciousness, and the kinds of relationships humans might have with even the most advanced AI. Through these discussions, this book investigates the theoretical and practical challenges to interpersonal encounter raised by the age of AI. (AI Research Group for the Centre for Digital Culture of the Dicastery of Culture and Education of the Holy See). (shrink)

The aim of the essay is to analyze the passages of the Cartesian oeuvre which could be related to the problem of other minds. After a brief presentation of the problem and what is known as the argument from analogy, we show that what we will call the automata passage is not an acknowledgement of the problem. Next, we raise a way of generating the problem, to show how it could be approached from Descartes’s works.

The present article, more than to deepen in the polemic classic Popper - Kuhn regarding the progress of the science, seeks to indicate some fundamental pillars that should be kept in mind as possibility for the elaboration of a curriculum in the teaching of the sciences. It is rescued of this discus..

The aim of this text is to examine the issue of truth telling in doctor-patient relationships, namely in the case of terminal patients. We analyze the problems and attitudes regarding truth telling that there are present when patients suffer from mortal diseases. We conclude that it is very important to keep a fluent and truthful communication in the doctor-patient relationship. We also examine and stress the role that general practitioners can play in the care of terminal patients at their home (...) and with their friends and/or relatives. (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es ensayar una explicación e interpretación de la introducción “Répétition et différence” de _Différence et répétition_ de Gilles Deleuze. Parte de la hipótesis de que es una pieza de un conjunto no desarrollado de filosofía moral. Esta pieza aborda cuatro elementos: conducta, ley, concepto y sujeto morales. El análisis detallado muestra que Deleuze esboza un programa de investigación de la acción moral que se inspira, como punto de partida, en el kantismo, y culmina en una (...) doble propuesta: acercamiento de la acción moral a la acción estética y ética de la potencia. Los resultados apuntan a una génesis artística del sujeto moral actual. (shrink)

El objeto de este trabajo es estudiar la relación del filósofo francés Roland Barthes (1915-1980) con la religión, en concreto el cristianismo. Para ello, indagaremos la presencia de la religión, como objeto, como tema y como motivo, en las obras de Barthes y en algunos escritos personales suyos. En conclusión, mostraremos que el cristianismo está presente a lo largo de toda su obra y es importante desde el punto de vista de este autor.

Partiendo de la descripción y caracterización general del poder en la sociedad occidental contemporánea realizada por M. Foucault, tratamos de responder algunas preguntas relativas a la resistencia y alternativa a la dominación, siguiendo la experiencia y la reflexión de X. Tarrío, un preso común, que, a nuestro modo de ver, muestra el papel que la moral y el derecho pueden �y deben� jugar en las prácticas y procesos de apropiación y apoderamiento y de oposición y contestación a la dominación.

Synthetic biology, as a research field, brings together molecular life scientists, computational biologists, and social scientists to engineer biological systems toward societally desired goals. Given the field’s broad multidisciplinarity and relatively young age, innovative educational methods are required to provide students with the needed background knowledge to push the field forward in the future. The international Genetically Engineered Machine competition is such an example where education and high-level research merge, providing the synthetic biology field with trained students, new ideas, and (...) novel results. In the 2021 edition alone, 343 teams from across the world completed the competition to tackle societal problems with synthetic biology. As Wageningen University & Research celebrates 10 years of participation in iGEM, we share our thoughts and experiences on supervising iGEM teams, which is especially relevant to organizers of current and new teams, and also others interested in the iGEM competition. (shrink)

Historia como devenir humano, historiografía como ciencia, historia como sueño e historiografía como síntesis explicativa. Finalmente, teoría historiográfica como delirio poético y como práctica metodológica milenaria que cubre nuestras necesidades de ser y sabernos individuos constituidos de nostálgica fragilidad. En este sentido, se reconoce el contexto revisionista actual de la historiografía chilena –1989-2006– como inicio y contrapunto del debate general que se intenta ilustrar. He ahí las bases de este trabajo.

El objeto del presente trabajo es examinar las relaciones entre la guerra, la política y la moral, desde la Ilustración europea a nuestra Posmodernidad global. Para ello, seleccionamos dos muestras representativas: una defensa política de la guerra, el realismo político, y una defensa moral de la paz, el antibelicismo popular. Analizamos ambos, subrayando sus principales argumentos y mostrando sus consecuencias históricas. Finalmente, abordamos las nuevas guerras de la segunda mitad del siglo XX y el comienzo de este Milenio.

This article critically examines the plain exit principle of Kukathas that argues as the best system to conciliate the demands of belonging to an indigenous culture and the right to dissent from their women members. We first review the tension between feminism of equality and the situation of indigenous women with their internal cultures. Second, we explore the thesis of Kukathas for conclude that it alone is not enough. Finally, it analyses an alternative solution that overlapping the right of exit, (...) a model of multicultural jurisdictions and adequate conception of deliberative democracy. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian (...) epistemology. (shrink)

Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...) (Fricker 2007, 5). In this paper, however, I identify different means by which our hermeneutic activities lead to social injustices, of both a practical and epistemic kind, and I identify different ways in which those injustices manifest themselves. Since Fricker’s use of the notion of “hermeneutical injustices” to denote a well-defined kind of injustice is rightfully well-established, I here refer to the more general kinds of injustices I have in mind as “hermeneutic injustices” instead. (shrink)